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CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES IN
CONTRACT-THE POOR RELATION?
Andrew Tettenborn*
While consequential damages have long been a part of contract law, the
legal boundaries of such losses have not been well defined. In seeking
to recreate a working definition for consequential damages in contract
claims, this Article explores the actual differences between
consequential and direct damages by looking at the application of
remoteness, foreseeability, and proof-of-loss standards to these damage
categories. Ultimately, this Article argues that damages for
consequential loss in contract should be regarded as subject to
substantially different rules from those applying to direct losses.
I. INTRODUCTION
When law professors talk about the various sorts of damages
courts award for breach of contract and the function these damages
serve, the discussion tends to center on a relatively small number of
familiar issues. Scholars are spoilt for choice if they want to rake
over such matters as expectation measures versus reliance measures,'
why we allow expectation claims at all,2 or at what point recovery of
reliance losses is a genuine alternative to a claim for lost profits.3
But one topic tends to be forgotten, and that is consequential losses
such as claims for personal injury, damage to property, or simple
cash profits foregone as a result of a breach of contract. These are
awkward. However much taken for granted, they cannot readily be
shoehorned into the venerable expectation, reliance, and restitution
* Professor of Law, University of Exeter School of Law.
1. Starting universally, if unoriginally, with L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1937). But the literature is immense.
A recent, more useful starting point is Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 99 (2000).
2. W. David Slawson, Why Expectation Damages for Breach of Contract Must Be the
Norm: A Refutation of the Fuller and Perdue "Three Interests" Thesis, 81 NEB. L. REV. 839
(2003).
3. As in, for instance, Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contracts
Damages, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1755 (1992).
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pigeonholes constructed in 1936,4 which still (though admittedly
decreasingly)5 inform most discussion of contract damages.6 They
are clearly not restitution. Furthermore, except in the trivial sense
that the victim expected not to suffer them and doubtless relied on
being free from them, consequential-losses claims do not have
anything to do with either expectation or reliance.7 Instead they
languish in the background like some elderly poor relative: everyone
knows they are there, but no one knows them very well, and most
people would prefer not to talk about them.
The thesis of this Article is that this sidelining of consequential
losses is unfortunate and that the rules relating to them merit
discussion just as much as those applicable to expectation or reliance
losses More importantly, this Article suggests, referring to both
American and English authority, that consequential damages
resulting from a breach of contract9 behave remarkably differently
from other kinds of damages in a number of respects. It then goes on
to suggest that a distinction between consequential and other losses is
both intellectually justifiable and founded in good sense.
4. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 52.
5. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 1, at 105-21. David W. Barnes & Deborah Zalesne, A
Unifying Theory of Contract Damage Rules, 55 SYRACUSE L. REv. 495, 503 (2005), state the
point more brutally: the distinction is simply "irrelevant to calculating damages for contract
breaches."
6. Interestingly, under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981), the
definition of the relevant interests is straight out of Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 347, 349 (1981) ("[T]he injured party has a right to
damages based on his expectation interest.... As an alternative... the injured party has a right
to damages based on his reliance interest."). Most textbooks also at least start by recognizing the
same scheme, though some (e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.8
(3d ed. 2004)) creditably refuse to be drawn in.
7. They appear, slightly grudgingly, as a footnote in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. c & illus. 4 (1981).
8. Not that this point is new. See, e.g., David W. Barnes, The Net Expectation Interest in
Contract Damages, 48 EMORY L.J. 1137, 1149 (1999) (referring to a fourth interest which he
calls the "curative interest"). This is much the same as what I refer to as consequential damages.
See also Eric G. Anderson, The Restoration Interest and Damages for Breach of Contract, 53
MD. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1994).
9. A similar argument can be made with respect to consequential damages under tort law;
however, this Article will only address this argument under contract law.
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II. WHAT ARE CONSEQUENTIAL LOSSES?
If we want to suggest that consequential losses are somehow
special, we need to first know what we mean by them. This is not
quite as easy as it sounds. In particular, although both the Uniform
Commercial Code ("U.C.C. ,,)1o and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts" occasionally refer to consequential losses, neither regards
the concept as a term of art nor places much emphasis on it. At times
its boundaries seem remarkably uncertain. 2 As a result, this Article
will leave these treatments aside and attempt to craft a new
definition. Losses, it is suggested, should be regarded as
consequential when they are plaintiff-specific, meaning, when their
amount is dependent on the position or circumstances of the
particular plaintiff.3  They are direct. If this is not the case, the
measure of compensation is conventional or a function of the
breach. '"
A few concrete examples will make this point less abstract.
Suppose Seller agrees to supply raw materials to Buyer for $10,000
but fails to deliver them when they are worth $12,000 in the market.
Alternatively, suppose Carrier hired by Buyer to transport the same
materials (again worth $12,000) negligently loses them. Classifying
these two claims, the $2,000 difference against Seller in the first case
10. U.C.C. section 305(a) (2007) provides that "neither consequential or special nor penal
damages may be had except as specifically provided in [the Uniform Commercial Code] or by
other rule of law." U.C.C. sections 2-710 and 2-715 then deal with the availability of incidental
and consequential damages to buyers and sellers. For the meaning of these terms in this context,
see Roy Ryden Anderson, Incidental and Consequential Damages, 7 J.L. & COM. 327, 364
(1987); Paul S. Turner, Consequential Damages: Hadley v. Baxendale Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 54 SMU L. REV. 655 (2001).
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981) (where the victim of a
contract breach is entitled to the value of performance, plus "any other loss, including incidental
or consequential loss, caused by the breach...").
12. For a brief discussion of the possible different meanings, see David W. Barnes &
Deborah Zalesn, The Shadow Code, 56 S.C. L. REV. 93, 99 (2004).
13. This is not entirely new. It has some similarities to a distinction drawn at the beginning
of the leading English text, HARVEY MCGREGOR, MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES §§ 1-035 to 1-040
(Sweet & Maxwell, 17th ed. 2003), between "normal" and financial losses, suffered in nearly all
cases, and consequential ones, which are not.
14. This parallels the distinction drawn by some lawyers between general and other
damages, as described in Roy Ryden Anderson, Incidental and Consequential Damages, supra
note 10, at 328-29. But "general damages" is such a protean term on both sides of the Atlantic
that I prefer not to use it here. For the various English meanings of "general damages" see, e.g.,
MCGREGOR supra note 13, §§ 1-029 to 1-036.
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or the $12,000 value claim against Carrier in the second, is
straightforward. These damages must, on any score, be considered
direct. The amount awarded is a function of the worth of the goods
in the market. The damages are calculated in an abstract way from
the value of which the plaintiff has been deprived. To put this point
another way, the measure of these damages would be the same
whoever the plaintiff was and whatever her circumstances may be.
Now, however, add in some additional losses. Suppose, that as
a result of Seller's failure to deliver the materials, Buyer is deprived
of the usual, foreseeable, and non-exorbitant $5,000 profit she would
have made from processing or reselling them. Additionally, suppose
that she also fails to get further orders worth $8,000 from third
parties who now, no doubt with reason, mistrust her supply chain.
What of these? On any reasoning, the $8,000 loss must be
consequential (if it is claimable at all, which it would not be absent
fairly specific knowledge by Seller of Buyer's business
arrangements). The $5,000, generally recoverable even in the
absence of special knowledge, 5 is less easy to identify at first sight.
For some purposes at least, it undoubtedly has been called direct, 6
but for others (an obvious example being insurance), 7 it is equally
clearly categorized as consequential. On the other hand, if one
applies the criterion of whether the quantification of the claim is
breach-specific or plaintiff-specific, there is no doubt that it is
consequential. There may be no lost profits at all, and even if there
are, their amount is entirely dependent on the facts surrounding the
plaintiffs business. For the same reason, damages for harm to a
buyer's property or personal injury to the buyer herself caused by
defective goods or botched services are always consequential.
18
15. For example, under the common law rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep.
145 (Exch. Ct.), and more particularly under U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (2007).
16. In England, for example, liability for this loss would not be excluded by a clause
restricting a contract-breaker's liability for consequential losses because such clauses are
interpreted as inapplicable to foreseeable losses falling under the first limb of the Hadley v.
Baxendale rule. New York similarly classifies damages as "direct" or "consequential" according
to which limb of Hadley they fall under. Roneker v. Kenworth Truck Co., 977 F.Supp. 237, 240
(W.D.N.Y. 1997). Many sections of the U.C.C. arguably do the same. See Paul S. Turner, supra
note 10.
17. Since an ordinary indemnity policy would not pay it, it would be recoverable only if
there were consequential-loss coverage.
18. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (2007).
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Once again, whether they are suffered is a matter of the luck of the
draw, depending on the circumstances of the individual plaintiff,
particularly whether she has any property vulnerable to damage and
so on.
The same distinction can, it is suggested, also be profitably
applied to some less obvious cases of contract damages. Two
instances in particular are important here. The first involves claims
for the cost of rectifying defects in work done for the plaintiff. A
straightforward example would be correcting or finishing
construction operations that ought to have been done by the
defendant but were not. The second involves damages for
nonpecuniary loss given to a plaintiff deprived of benefits under a
contract that was entered into with a clear emotional (or at least more
than financial) rationale. Both of these cases raise difficulties. But,
as I will argue below, if they are properly categorized-and, to
anticipate, I will suggest that they are direct rather than
consequential-many of these difficulties disappear.
III. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DIRECT
AND CONSEQUENTIAL LOSSES
At first sight it sounds odd to suggest that there is (or even
should be) any difference, apart from the name, between direct and
consequential losses. On the contrary, the modem tendency is to
think of a party breaching a contract as being liable for the
foreseeable loss resulting from his breach, no more and no less,
without singling out any particular sort of loss for special treatment.
Whatever contingent differences there may be, if a plaintiff can show
that she is foreseeably less well-off than she would have been had the
defendant not breached, that is it. It is beside the point to go on and
ask whether the impoverishment happened directly, at one step
removed, or at four.'9
Life, however, is more untidy than that.2" In practice, as will
appear, it may well make a difference whether the harm the plaintiff
19. David W. Barnes & Deborah Zalesne, A Unifying Theory of Contract Damage Rules, 55
SYRACUSE L. REV. 495 (2005).
20. As is, for that matter, the idea of a "loss" in the first place. Cf L.L. Fuller & William R.
Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53 (1937) ("[L]oss...
is not a datum of nature but the reflection of a normative order."); see also Andrew Tettenbom,
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is complaining of is necessary and immediate, or contingent and
consequential. Put shortly, the general rule is that as soon as a loss is
categorized as consequential in the sense used in this Article, the
plaintiff who seeks to recover it faces more hurdles than if it is not.
(a) Remoteness.
We may as well start with remoteness under the principle in
Hadley v. Baxendale2' or any analogous foreseeability rule that
applies. Admittedly, at first sight the difference between direct and
consequential losses in this connection is not obvious. Insofar as
there is such a difference (the argument runs), this can surely be
explained on the basis that consequential losses are ex hypothesi less
foreseeable than direct ones or by applying some analogous
reasoning."2
But the suggestion here is that this is not the whole story. We
can, it is submitted, go further and say that to all intents and
purposes, the remoteness rule is limited to consequential losses and
does not apply at all to direct losses." In particular, out of the
thousands of cases where plaintiffs have found their damages limited
by references to a doctrine of foreseeability, it is noteworthy that
virtually all have involved claims for consequential losses in some
What Is a Loss? in EMERGING ISSUES IN TORT LAW 441, 441-66 (Jason W. Neyers et al. eds.,
2007).
21. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Ct.).
22. For example, it could be said that direct measures such as the standard "value less price"
figures in sale of goods cases count, by definition, as foreseeable. Thus, such direct measures
count as damages arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach
of contract, id. at 151, or damages following from the breach "in the ordinary course of events."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(2)(a) (1981). See also Anderson, supra note 10,
at 338-39, 342 (suggesting that "[t]he nature of the damages, rather than the label attached to
them, makes incidental damages more easily recoverable"). The same view has sometimes
surfaced in England. See, e.g., Interoffice Tels. Ltd. v. Robert Freeman Co., [1958] 1 Q.B. 190,
202 (suggesting that losses of profits through ordinary market movements should generally be
regarded as foreseeable).
23. Such a conclusion is at least hinted at under U.C.C. § 2-715 (2007). Under that section,
incidental damages available to a seller are defined without qualification. Consequential damages
must be something "of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know .... See
generally Anderson, supra note 10, at 338 (explaining that the Code "states restrictions for the
recovery of consequential damages which ostensibly do not apply to incidental damages"). It
should be noted, however, that the correlation between incidental damages under the U.C.C. and
direct damages in this Article is not exact.
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form or another.24 The forms of loss involved have of course been
legion: lost sales, collapse of the plaintiff's business, long-tail lost
profits, damage to property, personal injury, psychological trauma, or
whatever. Nevertheless, what nearly always has been in issue is
damage resulting not directly but collaterally from a particular
breach, which is, to a greater or lesser extent, dependent on the
plaintiff's particular situation.
Direct loss claims, by contrast, are treated rather differently.. A
number of examples illustrate the point. A disappointed buyer of
goods can claim value less price,25 and the disappointed seller vice
versa.26 The defaulting carrier or bailee is liable for the value of
goods destroyed or the depreciation of goods damaged.27 The
property owner is entitled to the amount by which her property is
devalued as a result of bad work.28 But, however controversial these
measures of recovery may be in other respects,29 they are curiously
unaffected by criteria of foreseeability. On the contrary, the plaintiff
is generally able to recover them as a matter of course," even if their
extent is not foreseeable.3 True, one could say that this was simply a
function of the rule that foreseeable damages are recoverable even if
24. Notably, the same is true of every single example given in section 351 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981), the "foreseeable loss" section.
25. U.C.C. § 2-713 (2007).
26. Id. § 2-708.
27. 25 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 66:104
(4th ed. 2002).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2)(a) (1981).
29. Particularly, where the actual circumstances of the plaintiff suggest a clear measure of
financial loss, the issue is whether the plaintiff can choose to disregard the actual loss and sue for
the notional one. Compare Henry Gabriel, The Seller's Election of Remedies Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: An Expectation Theory, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429 (1988) (arguing that
the seller should be allowed to elect between the two remedies regardless of the seller's good
faith post-breach activities concerning the non-accepted goods) with Roy Ryden Anderson,
Damage Remedies Under the Emerging Article 2-An Essay Against Freedom, 34 HOUS. L. REV.
1065, 1067 (1997) (arguing that damages remedies must be limited to compensating monetarily
for the lost expectation of the injured party, "[t]hus, under article 2, an aggrieved party may not
use a damage provision that would provide a supracompensatory recovery").
30. See U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (2007).
31. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, at § 12.14 (liability for rise in market even if "startling and
extreme"). The same applies in England to such direct claims. Cf Wroth v. Tyler, [1974] Ch. 30
(illustrating that on the sale of a house, plaintiffs were entitled to damages including the rise of
house prices since the date of breach).
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the extent of damages are unforeseeably large.32 But this in turn
raises difficulties. Despite the reiteration of the "foreseeable
damages in an unforeseeable amount" rule, unforeseeably large
consequential lost profit claims are regularly disallowed.33 In short,
it seems simpler to say that foreseeability does not form a serious
barrier to claims for direct, as compared to consequential, loss.
The idea that the foreseeability rule is really a consequential
damages doctrine may also explain another otherwise puzzling
feature of remoteness-namely, the relation between remoteness in
contract and remoteness in tort. The problem is that even though
everyone regards it as obvious that Hadley v. Baxendale is a contract
limit that does not apply in tort suits,34 in many cases this is not true.
Take, for example, a malpractice plaintiff claiming some loss
allegedly consequent to the fault of her lawyer or accountant; it may
be profits foregone, the loss of a business, or whatever. If she sues in
contract, clearly the loss in respect of which she claims must be
foreseeable as a fairly substantial possibility. But what is interesting
is that the plaintiff cannot escape this rule by redesignating her suit
as tortious. Even if the jurisdiction concerned allows clients to sue in
either contract or tort,35 the result is the same: her loss remains
32. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 12.14, ("The magnitude of the loss need not have been
foreseeable, and a party is not disadvantaged by its failure to disclose the profits that it expected
to make from the contract."); see, e.g., Bamard v. Compugraphic Corp., 667 P.2d 117 (Wash.
App. Ct. 1983). Similarly in England, most recently, see the House of Lords in Jackson v. Royal
Bank of Scot., [2005] UKHL 3, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 377 (U.K.).
33. Thus, it is not hard to find statements that extraordinary or excessive profits are
irrecoverable. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, at § 12.14 (seller not liable for lost profit "to the
extent that it is extraordinary"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 cmt. b,
illus. 6 & 7 (1981). Compare Coastal Int'l Trading Ltd. v. Maroil AG, [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 92,
95 (Q.B.) (no profits recovery where "unusual terms as would render the plaintiffs' profit ...
unreasonable"). Indeed, it is difficult to see the classic Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v.
Newman Indus. Ltd., [1949] 2 K.B. 528 (U.K.) as doing much more than limiting profits on the
basis that they are unforeseeably large.
34. Straightforward authorities are Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 724 (2d
Cir. 1964) and Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd., [1969] 1 A.C. 350, 389-90 (H.L. 1967), both of
which state explicitly that Hadley v. Baxendale has no part to play in tort suits.
35. England allows this, almost without limitation. See Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates
Ltd., [1995] 2 A.C. 145 (H.L.) (U.K.). The tendency in the United States is similar, though not as
marked. See, e.g., Congregation of the Passion v. Touche Ross & Co., 636 N.E.2d 503 (I1. 2004)
(accountant); Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999) (engineer); Collins v. Reynard,
607 N.E.2d 1185 (Ill. 1992) (lawyer); Beachwalk Villas Condo Ass'n, Inc. v. Martin, 406 S.E.2d
372, (S.C. 1991) (architect). But see Rothberg v. Reichelt, 705 N.Y.S.2d 115 (App. Div. 2000).
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irrecoverable unless reasonably foreseeable.36 But if so, how can this
be reconciled with the acceptance that remoteness requirements in
tort are much less exacting, with perceptible, if highly unlikely, risks
still able to trigger liability? The answer, it is suggested, may well
be that the direct-indirect distinction referred to above is quietly
being applied across the contract-tort boundary. In contract, direct
loss is generally obtainable, but consequential loss is recoverable
only if clearly foreseeable. Just as in contract, so also in tort. Even
if a very small degree of likelihood is enough to establish liability on
principle, when it comes to recovering further consequential losses, a
much greater likelihood has to be shown equivalent to the more
exacting criterion of Hadley v. Baxendale.37
(b) Proof ofLoss.
We now turn to another area of potential difference between
direct and consequential losses: the rules as to proof of loss. As with
remoteness, at first sight this looks like fairly unrewarding territory.
Surely the general rule is simple: a contract plaintiff, like any other,
must prove her loss, and if she cannot do this, she recovers nothing
(or, more accurately, only nominal damages). In fact, however, it is
suggested that here too matters are more complex. In particular,
there are indications that what counts as proof of loss varies
according to the kind of loss in issue. To put it more provocatively,
the traditional rules as to proof are, like the foreseeability rule,
limited to consequential losses and do not apply in practice to direct
ones.
Let us begin with an obvious example: market difference claims
by buyers and sellers. We all know that in both the United States
and England, a disappointed seller prima facie recovers price less
36. See the English decisions in Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. Ltd.,
[1995] Q.B. 375 (U.K), and Birmingham Midshires Building Society v. Phillips, [1998] P.N.L.R.
468 (Ch.), referred to below. The indications are less clear in the United States, but compare the
old New York case of Kerr S.S. Co., Inc. v. Radio Corp. of America, 157 N.E. 140 (N.Y. 1927)
(even if there is concurrent liability in contract and tort, the Hadley rule applies to both claims for
negligent failure to send telegraphic message).
37. I have developed this argument further elsewhere. See ANDREW TETTENBORN ET AL.,
THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 6.50-6.64 (2003); see also Andrew Tettenborn, Hadley v. Baxendale:
Contract Doctrine or Compensation Rule?, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 505, 516-20. (2005).
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value,38 an aggrieved buyer recovers the converse differential,39 and a
receiver of defective goods recovers the value deficiency due to the
defect.4' However, what is striking is that the question of whether
any of these figures actually does anything, apart from putting in a
nominal appearance on the plaintiff's balance sheet or actually
affecting her business, is regarded as curiously irrelevant. This is
particularly true in England, where the relevant legislation 41 is still
(in effect) the same as the Uniform Sales Act drafted by Samuel
Williston" and thus continues43 to embody the pretty inflexible
common law prejudice in favor of market damages. 4 But it is also a
fair summary of the position under the U. C. C. Admittedly, here,
courts are more willing to take account of positive proof that the
plaintiff's actual loss is less than market damages. 45  For example, a
disappointed buyer who has actually covered for less than the market
price cannot collect a windfall by suing for value less price.46
38. This is provided for in legislation on both sides of the Atlantic. See U.C.C. § 2-708
(2007); Sale of Goods Act, 1979, s.50(3).
39. See U.C.C. § 2-713 (2007); Sale of Goods Act, 1979, s.51(3).
40. U.C.C. § 2-714 (2007); Roy Anderson, Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to
Accepted Goods, 57 MISS. L.J. 317 (1987). For England, see Sale of Goods Act, 1979, s.53(3).
41. The Sale of Goods Act, 1979 (re-enacting, with astonishingly few changes, its namesake
of 1893).
42. Now curiously forgotten, but reprinted in LAWRENCE VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF SALES app. at 507 (1931).
43. But even in England, the position may be changing. An interesting straw in the wind is
Bence Graphics International Ltd. v. Fasson UK Ltd., [1998] Q.B. 87 (U.K) (holding that a buyer
of defective raw materials who successfully incorporated them in her product without complaint
from customers could not rely on the English equivalent of U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (2007) and claim
the difference in value).
44. The connection is neatly described in Robert E. Scott, The Case for Market Damages:
Revisiting the Lost Profits Puzzle, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1155, 1161-62 (1990). The classic English
cases, still generally accepted as good law, are Rodocanachi, Sons & Co. v. Milburn Bros. (1886)
18 Q.B.D. 67 and Williams Bros. v. Agius Ltd. [1914] A.C. 510 (the latter on the statutory English
analog to U.C.C. § 2-713), both of which contradict the tendency of modem American authority
by flatly ignoring matters that are clearly going to reduce loss).
45. See, e.g., H-W-H Cattle Co. v. Schroeder, 767 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1985) (corresponding
to U.C.C. § 2-713 (2007)); Nobs Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.
1980) (corresponding to U.C.C. § 2-708 (2007)); Alafoss v. Premium Corp. of Am., 599 F.2d 232
(8th Cir. 1979) (under U.C.C. § 2-714); Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co.,
209 Cal. Rptr. 60 (Ct. App. 1984); Vorthman v. Keith E. Myers Enters., 296 N.W.2d 772 (Iowa
1980). See generally Anderson, supra note 29, at 1065 (examining cases in which market
damages overcompensate).
46. See U.C.C. § 2-713 cmt. 5 (2007); see also Anderson, supra note 29 at 1101 and
authorities there cited.
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Nevertheless, it remains accurate to say that market damages
continue to act as a conventional valuation of the plaintiffs
performance interest. Whatever the plaintiffs actual position is,
market damages are recoverable unless there are clear indications
that some particular other figure is more appropriate. Now again,
as with remoteness, this looks puzzling at first sight. It is all very
well to have a doctrine of strict proof of loss, but why have one that
covers some losses and not others? My suggestion, once again, is
that what lies behind this otherwise difficult distinction is a
difference between direct and consequential losses.
Market damages, particularly when dealing with generalized-
commodity contracts, might be dismissed as a special case. It is
suggested, however, that this particular point about proof of loss is
much more general. Three possible extensions may be worth
mentioning here, two of particular English relevance, and one of
equal significance on both sides of the Atlantic.
The first, which has arisen in direct and troublesome form in
England,48 , concerns a specialized type of lawsuit-namely, claims
for badly constructed buildings. Typically, the scenario is as
follows: A construction contractor employed by a client property
owner (or one of its subcontractors) does a bad job. However, before
the defects become apparent, the client sells the project to a buyer, to
whom it simultaneously assigns its rights under the construction
contract.49 Later, when sued by the buyer for the cost of correcting
the defect, the contractor pleads that the original client suffered no
loss and the buyer, therefore, has no substantial claim either." The
English courts have had to find an answer to this plea, whose sheer
47. See, e.g., Trans World Metals, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 769 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1985)
(corresponding to U.C.C. § 2-708 (2007)); Tongish v. Thomas, 840 P.2d 471, 475 (Kan. 1992);
Unlimited Equip. Lines, Inc. v. Graphic Arts Ctr., Inc., 889 S.W.2d 926 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)
(corresponding to U.C.C. § 2-713 (2007)). The last case is particularly instructive. There was
very little indication of what the plaintiffs had actually stood to make out of the contract. The
court held was that a market award was mandated in the absence of clear proof of a particular
alternative measure. Unlimited Equip. Lines, 889 S.W.2d at 941.
48. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
49. Typically this issue arises over shopping malls, which by English practice are
constructed by real estate developers who then immediately sell to investors such as insurance
corporations or pension funds. But it can arise elsewhere as well.
50. The buyer has no substantial claim because, on any orthodox analysis, the assignee of a
right stands in the shoes of the assignor and cannot be in a better position than the latter was in.
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logic is matched only by its moral and commercial demerit. Despite
an occasional tendency to posit a bare-faced exception to either the
rules on the need to prove loss5 or the rules of assignment, 2 they
have in at least three cases reached a more subtle conclusion-
namely, that the provision of bad building services is regarded as
causing a loss measured by the cost of rectifying the work. 3 Hence
the wind is taken out of the defendant's sails at the outset.
Yet more interestingly for our purposes, it was suggested in one
of these cases that this reasoning only applied to measures of
damages measured by an "objective standard" and not to other
damages such as loss of profits caused by delay. 4 This suggestion,
which has common sense behind it, reproduces the distinction we
have been drawing here between plaintiff-specific and non-plaintiff-
specific damages. Once more, in the case of the latter but not the
former, it seems to be increasingly accepted that the rules of proof of
loss simply work in a different way.
Another memorable decision in England, incidentally mentioned
once or twice in U.S. law review articles,55 brings the issue out
clearly in a slightly different context. In Ruxley Electronics Ltd. v.
Forsyth,56 a homeowner complained that his new swimming pool
51. The House of Lords was prepared to do just this in Linden Gardens Trust Ltd. v. Lenesta
Sludge Disposals Ltd., [1994] 1 A.C. 85 (H.L.). In this case they followed an enigmatic Scottish
decision (Dunlop v. Lambert, (1839) 7 Eng. Rep. 824 (H.L.) (allowing a contractor in a few
anomalous cases to sue for a loss suffered by someone else)). Dunlop is discussed in THE LAW
OF DAMAGES §§ 3-46 to 348 (Andrew Tettenborn et al. eds., 2003). See also Darlington
Borough Council v. Wiltshier N. Ltd., [1995] 1 W.L.R. 68. Where the claim is in tort for latent
damage to property, the House in a Scottish appeal was once again prepared to introduce an
exception to ensure justice was done. G.U.S. Prop. Mgmt. Ltd. v. Littlewoods Mail Order Stores
Ltd., [1982] S.L.T. 533 (H.L).
52. This occurred in Offer-Hoar v. Larkstore Ltd. [2006] 1 W.L.R. 2926 (Eng.), where the
Court of Appeal blithely punched a hole in the rule that the assignee could do no better than the
assignor by holding that the assignee had the rights the assignor would have had if there had been
no sale and thus no assignment.
53. See Alfred McAlpine Constr. Ltd. v. Panatown Ltd., [2001] 1 A.C. 518, 545-46, 587-88
(H.L. 2000) (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Millett); Linden Gardens Trust Ltd. v. Lenesta
Sludge Disposals Ltd., [1994] 1 A.C. 85, 96 (H.L. 1993) (appeal taken from Eng. and Wales)
(Lord Griffiths); Darlington Borough Council v. Wiltshier N. Ltd., [1995] 1 W.L.R. 68 (Steyn,
L.J.). It must be admitted that two other members of the House were less enthusiastic. See Alfred
McAlpine Constr. Ltd., I A.C. at 533-34, 570-71 (Lord Clyde and Lord Jauncey).
54. See Alfred McAlpine Constr. Ltd., I A.C. at 554 (Lord Goff).
55. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 559, 595 (2006); Tony Weir, All or Nothing?, 78 TUL. L. REV. 511, 535 (2004).
56. [1996] A.C. 344 (H.L. 1995) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
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was built a few inches too shallow but candidly admitted that he had
suffered neither a penny piece of money loss nor any appreciable
inconvenience. The court nevertheless awarded him £2,500, and the
House of Lords (having understandably denied him the cost of
digging out the pool as both unintended and wholly
disproportionate)57 upheld the judgment. One judge in particular
made the reason for this abundantly clear. This sum, he said, was
justified as made simply on account of, and to mark, the denial of the
homeowners's nonpecuniary interests." Reading between the lines,
what is envisaged here is an award for direct, non-plaintiff-specific
loss, made without regard for the requirements of proof that obtain
elsewhere in the law of damages. This is indeed the only sensible
interpretation; were we to regard it as an award for some
consequential loss, we immediately come up against the point that no
consequences of any kind were alleged, much less proved. 9
A third type of case represents a problem familiar on both sides
of the Atlantic. This is where the victim of a breach of contract
claims a non-pecuniary loss. Now, the instinctive assumption here is
that a plaintiff seeking damages of this type is effectively alleging a
discrete (that is, in our sense, consequential) result of some wrong.
A plaintiff disappointed in a costly but grimly joyless vacation,
distraught when incompetent attorneys leave her subject to
harassment by unwelcome admirers, or incandescent at builders who
fail to construct according to orders is on this argument no different
from a plaintiff complaining of a painful broken leg resulting from a
traffic accident or rotted floorboard. The only distinction is that her
injury takes a different, less tangible form. Hence the common view
57. To this extent, in reproducing the notorious Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.,
382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962), where the lessee failed to perform a provision of a lease requiring the
lessee, at the end of the lease, to perform remedial work, which would have cost an estimated
$29,000 but which would have increased the value of the farm of the lessors' farm only $300.
The relative economic benefit rule, rather than cost performance rule, was applicable, and the
lessors could recover only $300.
58. See Ruxley Elecs. Ltd. v. Forsyth, [1996] A.C. 344, 361 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)
(Lord Mustill). Lord Bridge seems to have had similar ideas. See id. at 353 (Lord Bridge).
59. It is worth noting that a later case, also in the House of Lords, lends some support to this.
In Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust, (2004) 1 A.C. 309 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Eng.), a similar non-plaintiff-specific award was made in another context. Explicitly not
dependent on proof of loss, the award was made to the victim of a failed sterilization to mark (but
not to compensate) the fact that the plaintiff now had an unwanted child.
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that the proper criterion of whether such damages can be had is to
ask whether the contract was one to provide excitement (or the lack
of it)6" or a Hadley v. Baxendale-style enquiry as to whether such
mental suffering was foreseeable.6
But this analysis raises one substantial difficulty. plaintiff
claiming damages for a broken leg must prove her affectation, and if
she cannot do so, she gets nothing. By contrast, deciding whether a
plaintiff has proved some supposed nonpecuniary loss such as
distress or harassment would seem practically impossible, and
certainly there seems little evidence that plaintiffs are seriously
expected to do so. Nor, conversely, is there much indication that a
defendant is allowed to reduce his exposure by alleging that the
plaintiff was either unusually phlegmatic or indeed not really
unhappy at all.62
This is, to say the least, troublesome. On the other hand, most
of the problems disappear if we re-categorize such awards as not
having anything to do with consequential recovery at all. Insofar as
a contract protects and, in the case of breach, allows compensation of
nonpecuniary interests, the better approach is to say that the
compensation is conventional and non-plaintiff-specific. This would
be done in the same way as price-less-value damages and similar
awards in sales of goods or damages under the principle in Ruxley v.
Forsyth mentioned above. If this view is accepted, then the fact that
the plaintiff cannot actually prove tangible distress or indeed any
60. For U.S. examples, see Jankowski v. Mazzotta, 152 N.W.2d 49 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967);
FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, at § 12.17. For England, see, e.g., Jarvis v. Swan's Tours Ltd.,
[1973] Q.B. 233; Farley v. Skinner [2001] UKHL 49, [2002] 2 A.C. 732 (appeal taken from
Eng.); Hamilton-Jones v. David & Snape, [2003] EWHC 3147 (Ch), [2004] 1 W.L.R. 924.
61. Some U.S. courts have taken this line. See, e.g., Lane v. KinderCare Ctrs., Inc., 588
N.W.2d 715 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) In Lane, a child was negligently left locked in a daycare
nursery when her caretakers went home, and damages were awarded for distress suffered by the
mother on the basis that non-commercial contracts were within Hadley v. Baxendale criteria. Id.;
Groh v. Broadland Builders, Inc., 327 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (breach of a
residential construction contract); Fogleman v. Peruvian Assocs., 622 P.2d 63, 65 (1980) (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1980) (wrongful firing). The "casket cases" are often decided on the same basis. See,
e.g., Lamm v. Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. 1949). Some courts add a further requirement that
the breach be willful and wanton. See, e.g., Giampapa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 64 P.3d 230
(Colo. 2003); see also Douglas J. Whaley, Paying for the Agony: The Recovery of Emotional
Distress Damages in Contract Actions, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 935 (1992).
62. Though there is at least one maverick Canadian decision, Cringle v. N. Union Ins. Co.,
(1981) 124 D.L.R. 3d 22 (Can.), which refused such damages partly on the ground of no proved
actual distress.
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particular affectation becomes irrelevant, and the availability of
nonpecuniary awards slides neatly into place.
IV. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OUGHT To BE DIFFERENT
So far I have discussed a number of ways in which
consequential damages seem to be treated differently in practice
from other kinds of damages. But now for the question of principle:
should they be regarded differently, or is this treatment simply an
illogical affectation that a mature legal system ought to do its best to
get rid of?
The argument for this latter point of view is not difficult to see.
It is an inherently attractive and certainly simple view that on
principle, a contract-damages plaintiff should be entitled to recover
her loss, no more and no less. Even if this loss is made up of
separate components corresponding to direct losses and
consequential losses following from the breach, there is no reason to
regard this separation as anything more than a fact of legal life or as
a matter justifying any difference in treatment. Loss, after all, is loss.
Either the plaintiff should be allowed to recover it, or she should not
(e.g., because it is too remote or because she has failed to mitigate
her damages or for a host of other reasons). In any case the nature or
provenance of the damages she is claiming should be beside the
point. Nevertheless, it is suggested that however attractive at first
sight, the suggestion that different kinds of losses should not be
distinguished becomes less convincing as one looks closer at it.
To begin with, it is worth making the point that the identification
of all damages into a single category of "loss" is a habit somewhat
peculiar to contract lawyers. Once we move outside contract into
tort (where an exactly parallel argument can be made that the
plaintiffs fundamental entitlement should be to recover her "loss,"
pure and simple), there has never been any particular difficulty with
separating direct or standardized damages from consequential,
plaintiff-dependent ones. Property torts are a straightforward
example. If an item of property is damaged, destroyed, or converted,
the owner receives its depreciation or value as the case may be. We
do not go further and ask what "actual" or pocket-book loss she has
suffered. Nor do we worry about the fact that she might have sold
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the asset for full value, or would have given it away the next day.63 It
is only where the plaintiff seeks to go further and recover
consequential losses that we require losses to be proved with
specificity.64
Second, the idea that consequential damages ought to be treated
on par with direct losses depends on the assumption that the two
claims are of equal moral strength or, to put it another way, on the
assumption that a right to claim damages for a breach of contract
must logically extend to consequential losses.65 But the truth of this
assumption is by no means obvious. The recovery of consequential
damages is not in any way inherent in the idea of damages as a
substitute for contractual performance. For example, suppose A
agrees to provide B with goods or services, such as soybeans or web-
hosting services. B's entitlement in such a case is therefore an
entitlement to soybeans or web hosting; this is what the contract
provides, no more and no less. Now assume the promised benefit is
not forthcoming. If B instead receives her money value from A, then
it is perfectly plausible to argue that given that all damages in the
nature of things have to be reduced to money payments, she has now
received all she deserves. B has the money equivalent of what A
ought to have received in specie. It is undoubtedly true that B may
have suffered further losses as well, and for that matter foreseeable
ones. But it does not follow that the avoidance of these losses
formed part of B's entitlement. A never expressly promised that B
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 927 (1979) (providing for the "market value"
measure of damages for conversion or destruction). Additionally, the comments to section 927
make it clear that this measure of damages may well exceed the plaintiffs actual loss. See, e.g.,
id. at illus. 4. Typical English authorities include The Charlotte [1908] P. 206 (U.K.) (involving
destruction of property in which plaintiff recovered in full even though property was at risk of
third party who paid plaintiff for it) and Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co., [2002]
UKHL 19 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (involving conversion claim in which plaintiff
recovered full value despite clear evidence that others would later have deprived plaintiff of same
property in any event).
64. A neat English example, in contrast to the cases in the previous note, is Dimond v.
Lovell, [2002] 1 A.C. 384 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (refusing damages for loss of use of
car where plaintiff rented a substitute but then invoked technical consumer credit defense and
avoided having to pay the rental).
65. The pervasive assumption that liability for loss automatically means liability for
consequential loss is astonishingly unarticulated. For a brief discussion of it in the context of
torts, see Andrew Tettenborn, Property Damage and Economic Loss, 34 C.L.W.R. 128, 136-37
(2005).
Fall 2008] CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES IN CONTRACT 193
would not suffer them. We may of course extend A's obligation to
make him compensate B for the further losses she has suffered and
for good reason. For example, one might well think that business
benefits from the extra security this grants to a plaintiffs
expectations. But there is nothing necessary in this process. Indeed,
there would be nothing illogical or incoherent about a legal system
that merely awarded direct losses for breach of contract and excluded
all consequences from compensation.66
Of course hardly anyone seriously argues that liability for
consequences should be entirely excluded from contract damages.
To an extent, we accept that at least sometimes contract law should
value not only strict entitlements but expectations as well. This is,
moreover, understandable since everyone knows that people actually
do contract with some end in mind apart from simply receiving the
contract performance tout court. It also makes commercial sense
that at least some of those expectations should be made good in
damages if proper performance is not forthcoming. But this does not
mean that all expectations (or even all foreseeable ones) should be
protected. On the contrary, some are more worth protecting than
others. In other words, there is every reason to limit or exclude
liability for some consequences (exemplified by many building
contractors who exclude liability for consequential losses in many of
their contractual relationships).
One such case concerns proportionality. It makes good sense to
protect a plaintiffs expectations where they are closely connected
with, and proportionate to, the contractual performance itself (an
obvious example being resale profits whose prospect is clearly made
known to a seller). But the moral-and commercial-case weakens
considerably where those expectations are entirely disproportionate
to what was bought. Take the example of a farmer who orders a
small but vital part for a harvester from the only supplier. If the part
is not delivered, the supplier is obviously in breach. However, it is
by no means obvious that he should, for that reason alone, be liable
66. This approach is not quite as outlandish as it seems. Robert E. Scott & George G.
Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM.
L. REv. 1428, 1453-55 (2004) comes close to adopting this approach regarding contracts as
importing an option not to perform on paying one's co-contractor the value of the putative
performance.
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for the farmer's whole lost harvest resulting from his inability to use
the harvester, even if he knew (which he probably did) that the loss
might be in prospect. Indeed, the problematic nature of cases of this
sort has been recognized to some extent in the United States, where
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts accepted,67 and the U.C.C.
revision nearly provided,68 that just some limitation was in order.
Another convincing reason to treat consequential liability with
some care, and certainly not as giving rise to liability as a matter of
course, comes from the need to have close regard to the nature of the
obligation undertaken by the defendant. Even if it is accepted that
there should be some liability for direct losses, it does not necessarily
follow that other consequential liability should follow as of course.
In tort, this is regarded as elementary; different torts provide
recovery for different kinds of loss. A libel claimant seeking
damages for personal injury or other nonreputational loss, for
example, faces considerable difficulties;69 so also, because of the
economic loss rule, does a plaintiff claiming business losses from a
defendant who negligently damages someone else's thing.70 The
defendant's duty-of care or otherwise-simply does not extend to
losses of that sort. Insofar as the plaintiff seeks compensation, he is
met with a plea of "no breach."
In contract, the matter is not as easy because a contract is either
kept or not, and if it is not, the defendant then is ipso facto in breach.
Nevertheless, there are good reasons for applying a similar rule here
and not simply saying that the defendant is liable for all foreseeable
67. See the enigmatic RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(3) (1981)
(specifically permitting a court to disallow even foreseeable loss "if it concludes that in the
circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid disproportionate compensation"); see generally
M. N. Kniffin, A Newly Identified Contract Unconscionability: Unconsionability of Remedy, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247 (1988) (addressing whether, under certain circumstances, it may be
fairer to impose some limit on foreseeable contract damages).
68. See Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and the Law of Consequential Damages:
Default Theory and Cognitive Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339 (1998).
69. Authority is split on both sides of the Atlantic. See M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Mental
or Physical Suffering as Element of Damages for Libel or Slander, 90 A.L.R. 1175 (1934), and
the more positive RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623 (1977). For English examples, see
MCGREGOR, supra note 13, at § 39-030; ANDREW TETTENBORN ET AL, THE LAW OF DAMAGES
§§ 18.30-18.31 (2003).
70. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); The Mineral
Transporter, [1985] 2 All E.R. 935 (P.C.) (appeal taken from N.S.W.).
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loss. A series of English malpractice cases7 makes the point clear.
For example, a real estate valuer overvalues security for a secured
lender. If the borrower fails and the security is sold at a loss to the
lender, the valuer is liable for the amount of the valuation but not for
further losses caused by a property meltdown, even if (a) those losses
would not have happened but for the loan and (b) the meltdown was
clearly on the cards at the time the contract was made.7" The duty of
the valuer was to value the security at the time of lending. While the
valuer should clearly be liable for the amount of overvaluation at that
time, subsequent depreciation is rightly regarded as outside the scope
of its duty. Similarly, lawyers who misadvise real estate buyers of
defects in title such as unexpected easements are not liable for other
losses suffered by the buyers on the transaction,73 and neither are
corporate accountants who misaudit a corporation in the group liable
for losses caused by further intragroup lending. 4  However
foreseeable these further losses, they are not within the ambit of the
duty undertaken by the defendant. Once again, the fact that
particular loss happens to be consequential is an important factor in
the determination that it ought to be treated differently.
V. CONCLUSION
This is a short Article, designed to make a short point. Its
argument is simply this: that damages for consequential loss in
contract are, and ought to be, regarded as different from damages for
direct losses. They are in fact subject to different rules and rightly
so. This is a fact that ought to be recognized in contracts
scholarship. One can only hope that in future years as much will be
written about them as a category as about other categories such as
expectation, reliance, and other losses.
71. There is the occasional flicker of a similar fire in the United States. See First Fed. S & L
Ass'n v. Charter Appraisal Co., 724 A.2d 497 (Conn. 1999).
72. See the seminal decision of the House of Lords in S. Austl. Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. York
Montague Ltd., [1997] A.C. 191. It is discussed in CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS §§ 10-138, 10-
167, 10-168 (19th ed. 2006).
73. See Lloyds Bank Plc v. Crosse & Crosse [2001] Lloyd's Rep. P.N. 452 (Court of
Appeal.).
74. See Galoo Ltd. v. Bright Grahame Murray {1995] 1 All E.R. 16 (Eng.). See also Bank
of Credit & Commerce Int'l v. Price Waterhouse, [1997] 4 All E.R. 781 (Ch.).
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